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SUPREME COURT

OF MASSACHUSETTS. 1 '

Warranty on sale of Chattels-ParolEvidence to vary Written, Con.ract-Damagesfor Breach of Contract- Construction of Contract.In an action to recover damages for the breach of an implied warranty of
reasonable fitness, the following contract was proved: the defendants
wrote to H., who was then a partner of the plaintiff's, on March 29th,
saying, "we propose to make you eighteen or twenty-two retorts in dry
sand, with two heads each, like the one furnished you in February last,
weighing about 3000 lbs. each, for $100 each;" H. replied, "you will
please make for me eighteen retorts, as per memorandum and terms in
yours of March 29, and directions given by myself and G." Held, that
the contract contained no implied warranty that the retorts should be fit
for any special purpose, and that no such warranty could be added to it
by parol; that the words, "like the one furnished you in February last,"
should be construed to apply to the quality of workmanship, as well as to
the size, shape, and exterior form; and that, under the clause referring
to directions by H. and G., a compliance with the requirements of the
contract as to the mode of casting and quality might be wived by them,
and, if so waived, the plaintiffs would be bound thereby, and in the absence of fraud or bad faith on the part of the defendants, the amount of
the knowledge of H. and G. as to the best method of casting was immaterial: Whilmore vs. South Boston Iron Co.
A written contract for the manufacture of retorts cannot be affected by
proof of a custom that, in the absence of an express agreement, founders
shall not be held to warrant their castings against latent defects; and
that, in case of apparent defects, they shall be entitled to have castings
returned to them within a reasonable time, and to replace them with new
ones: Id.
The rule of damages in an action for a breach of warranty in articles
which are manufactured under an agreement, but which are not furnished
for any particular use, is the difference in value between the articles
actually furnished, and such as should have been furnished: id.
Criminal Law---.Murder, in attempting Abortion-Existence-Pleading-Practice.-Inan indictment for murder by poison, it is not necessary
I From Charles Allen, Esq., State Reporter.
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to allege that the poison was administered by the defendant to the
deceased with an intent to kill: Commonwealth vs. .ersey.
The court will not order an officer, having charge of witnesses who have
been excluded from the court-room until they should severally be called
to testify, to prohibit them from reading the newspaper accounts of the
evidence in the ease : Id.
On the trial of an indictment for murder by poison, in which one count
alleges that the deceased was pregnant, and was induced to take the poison
by assurance of the defendant that it was a medicinal preparation which
would produce a miscarriage, evidence of a conversation two or three years
before the time of the acts charged, in which the defendant applied to a
witness for information upon the subject of procuring abortions, is inadmissible: Id.
If a medical witness, on cross-examination, has identified certain medical
advertisements as his, they may be read to the jury as a portion of the
cross-examination, for the purpose of affecting his credit, but the newspaper in which they are contained cannot be laid before the jury: Id.
Evidence that the defendant in an indictment refused to fly, when
advised to do so, after suspicions against him were excited, is inadmissible
in defence: Id.
Action-Liability of .Magistratefor Issuing void Execution-measure
of Damages-Evidence in Mitigation.-A magistrate who has rendered
judgment for the plaintiff in an action pending before him, and, on request
for an execution, has issued one which is invalid on its face, is liable for
such damages as are the natural, necessary and proximate consequences of
his wrongful act; but not for the costs of levying the execution, or losses
to which the plaintiff has been subjected by reason of attempting to enforce
it : Noxon vs. Hill.
In an action against a magistrate to recover damages for his wrongful
act in issuing an execution which was invalid on its face, he may show in
mitigation that the condition and circumstances of the.judgment debtor
were such that nothing could have been collected upon a valid execution : Id.
Vendor and endee-Notefor Purchase 2one ye When FalseRep resenta-"
tions as Defence.-In an action upon a note given for the price of land,
the defendant cannot be allowed to prove, by way of recoupment in damages, that the plaintiff made false representations as to the quality and
productiveness of the soil, and the number of acres contained within boundaries which were truly pointed out, by which the defendant was deceived
and thereby induced to make the purchase: Gordon vs. Parmelee.
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CharitableUse, Validity of-Trustec, Renuiciation by, whee Presumed
WiZZ, Devise Invalid as Restrainin Alienationt--Aliens-Efect of Partial Invalidity in Residuary Bequests.-A gift to charity, which is void
at law for want of an ascertained beneficiary, will be upheld by the courts
of this State, if the thing given is certain; if there is a competent trustee
to take the fund and administer it as directed, and if the charity itself be
precise and definite: Beekman vs. Bonor.
In other respects charitable trusts are subject to the rules which appertain to trusts in general. The trust must be capable of execution by a
judicial decree in affurmance of the gift as the donor made it. The cypres
power, as exercised in England in cases of charity, has no existence in the
jurisprudence of this State: Id.
A charitable gift of a sum which is left uncertain, or which is left to
the discretion of executors who have renounced the trust, is void, and the
next of kin are entitled to the fund. It seems that such a defect is incurable, even by the cy-pres power: Id.
An executor who renounces his office, the renunciation being followed
by many years of total non-interference with the estate, is deemdd also to
have renounced the trusts conferred by the will, which are personal and
discretionary: Id.
A gift to executors of money, to be applied in their discretion to the
use of societies for the support of indigent and respectable females, without further designation of the beneficiaries, the executors having renounced"
the trust, cannot be upheld: Id.
Where a residuum of personal estate is disposed of by a will, in two
parts, and the first disposition is invalid, the sum does not go to the legatee of the other part, but goes to the next of kin -Id.
And where the sum devoted to the invalid prior purpose, cannot be
ascertained by reason of the failure of that purpose or otherwise, the gift
of the remainder is void for uncertainty in the amount: Id.
A bequest of a sum of money, to be invested in land, of which the
rents and profits are to be applied to certain beneficiaries during fifteen
years, the land then to be sold and the proceeds divided amongst the same
persons, is void, because it contemplates a trust which would unlawfully
ouspend the power of alienation: Id.
-

1 From E. P. Smith, Esq., State Reporter.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

And where such a bequest leaves the sum not exceeding a certain
limit, in the discretion of executors, and the executors have renounced,
the gift cannot be sustained as a pecuniary legacy by disregarding the void
directions to convert it into land, and then to re-convert it into money.
The amount being unascertained, the bequest wholly fails: Id.
A bequest of money, to be laid out in lands for the benefit of aliens,
who are to have the possession and enjoyment, contravenes the statute of
wills, and is void: Id.
Vendor and Vendee- Title to Chattels derived through a Fraud-Husband and Wie-Ambiguous Possession-Purchaserwithout NoticeMortgagefor FutureAdvances.-Tbe definition in the 2d Revised Statutes,
page 702, section 30, of the term "felony" when used in a statute, has not
so changed the common law as to prevent a purchaser in good faith and
for value, obtaining title to goods, which the original vendee procured by
false pretences: Fassett vs. Smith.
The case of Andrew vs. Dietcrich (14 Wend., 36), in this respect
overruled.
The possession by a husband of his wife's real estate is to be taken as
her possession, so as not to put a purchaser upon inquiry as to the rights
of a third person of whom the husband, to cover his own fraud, took a
lease unknown to the purchaser: id.
A creditor, who took from his debtor a mortgage declared to be a continuing security for an amount less than the debt, held, to have made subsequent advances on the faith of the mortgage, although the original indebtedness was never reduced, but was continually increasing : Id.
Municipal Corporation Tax-Payer or Loan. older no rig t, as such,
to Maintain an Action to Restrain Acts of Corporate Officers.-There is
no distinction between a municipal corporation and towns or counties,
which enables a taxable inhabitant of the former to maintain an action to
restrain or avoid a corporate act not affecting his private interest, as distinct from that of other inhabitants: Roosevelt vs. Draper.
Nor can such a suit be maintained by an inhabitant who is also a creditor, holding the public stock of the corporation, to avoid an alienation of
its property upon which he has no specific or general lien, and which is
not shown to be essential to the security of the corporate creditors: Md.
A Governor of the Almshouse is one of the heads of departments, and
an officer of the city of New York, prohibited, by chapter 187 of 1849,
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section 19, from being interested in the purchase of any real estate belong-"
ing to the corporation: Id.

WTl-Where Widow a Witness against .Probate.-An order of the
Supreme Court, reversing a Surrogate's decree, admitting a will to probate for error in law, and remitting the proceedings to the Surrogate, is a
final determination in the Supreme Court, and is appealable to this court:
Talbot vs. Talbot.
A widow, cited, but who does not appear or contest the probate of her
husband's will, is a competent witness for the contestants, as against the
objection that she is a party to the proceeding; and no formal order,
dismissing her as a party, or otherwise providing for her examination, is
necessary: Id.
Where, on the hearing before the Surrogate, there is general evidence
of the execution by the husband of a previous will, under which the widow
would take the same provision as under the will offered for probate, the
validity of the first will is to be assumed in support of the competency of
the widow as against the objection of interest: Id.
SUPREME

COURT

OF NEW YORK, GENERAL

TERM, SECOND

DISTRICT,

May, 1861.1
Agreement-Statute of Frauds.-The plaintiff was employed by G. to
build for one S. a machine for crushing ore; S. having previously arranged
with D. & Co., to pay for the same, and the plaintiff looking to D. & Co.
for payment, and commencing work upon the machine. Subsequently,
D. & Co. refused to pay for the machine, and the plaintiff, on being
informed of such refusal, declined proceeding under his contract; whereupon the defendant promised, verbally, that if the plaintiff would go on
and complete the machinery, he, the defendant, would pay for it. Held,
that this was not an agreement to pay the debt of another, nor within the
statute of frauds. The first contract was rescinded, and the agreement of
the defendant was not collateral, but was an independent and original
agreement, and, as such, valid and binding: Quintardvs. De Wolf.
Powers and Jurisdiction of Supreme Court- Construction of WillsInfants-Determinationof Claims to Real Estate.-The Supreme Court
possesses all the powers and exercises all the functions, both of the Supreme
I Fromi Hon. 0. L. Barbour, Reporter of the Court.
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Court and the former Court of Chancery; but it has not acquired, by the
blending of the two tribunals, any right or authority which did not belong
to one or the other of their formerly separate jurisdictions: Onderdonk
vs. Mott and Others.
The action and administration of the Court is perfectly distinct in affording legal or equitable remedies: Id.
Where there is no trust, and there is no personal estate in the distribution of which any trust can arise, devisees who claim merely legal estates
in the real property, cannot bring a suit in equity to obtain a judicial construction of the will of the testator: Id.
If the question to be determined is a purely legal question concerning
the nature of the estates created by a will in the lands devised, it seems
the proper remedy is in court of law by an action of ejectment: Id.
The whole power of the court to order a sale of the lands of infants is
derived from the statute. There is no such original jurisdiction in a Court
of Equity : Id.
If such statutory jurisdiction can be exercised upon bill or complaint,
as well as in the ordinary mode by petition, still there is no authority for
uniting in such a suit parties who claim a legal title adverse to the infant,
and compelling them to litigate that claim and have it passed upon; and
there are insuperable objections to such a course: id.
To authorize a proceeding under the statute for the determination of
claims to real estate, the claim of the defendant must be adverse to the
party in possession : 1d.
Proceedings cannot be instituted by one having a life estate in premises
under a will, against the devisees in remainder. Nor by one who is not
in possession: Id.

GENERAL TERM, SIXTH DISTRICT, July,

1861.

Revocation of Will.-The intention of a testator to cancel or revoke a
clause in his will, however strongly declared, is of no consequence unless
it be carried out by some act amounting, in judgment of law, to an actual
cancellation or revocation: Clark vs. Smith.
A testator having an only son, James W. Smith, devised certain real
estate to his 'Cson, James W. Smith." After the execution of the will,
he, with a pen, erased from the clauses of the will containing the devise,
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the name "James W. Smith," leaving the word "son" uncancelled.
Held, that neither the will nor the devises to James W. Smith were
revoked by the erasures: Id.
GENERAL TERM, SEVENTH DISTRICT,

December, 1860, and March, 1861.

Partnership.-The interest of a partner in the partnership property
consists in his rateable proportion of the assets after the payment of all
the debts of the partnership. In a suit in equity for a settlement of the
copartnership affairs, no decree can rightfully be made for the payment by
one partner of any sum to another except upon this basis: Hayes vs. Reese.
If the partner against whom a decree is obtained upon a final accounting between him and his copartuers for the payment hy him of an ascertained balance to another, is subsequently compelled by legal process to
pay partnership debts to an amount equal to the sum remaining unpaid
upon the judgment, this will not entitle him to maintain an action against
his former copartners to have the amount of such partnership debts so
paid by him ascertained, and for a decree directing that such amount be
allowed to him as payment upon the decree: Id.
£Tsury.-When promissory notes of equal amounts are exchanged, onhe
is equal in value to the other, and there is no usury 'n the transactdln ;
but when either party makes an advantage in the aifanguient, Over a'nd
above seven per cent., then the case is one of usury, if the tf~ilsaction was
designed as, or was connected with, a loan of money: howas M. Musrray et al.
Money is equal to money in such a transaction, but nothing else is
equivalent to money. Where, upon a loan of money, anything else is
claimed to be equivalent to money, the lender must show the equality;
and if any other thing than money is put upon a borrower in an exchange
of notes, in connection with, and as a condition of, a loan of money, the
transaction is presumptively usurious in law: Id.
The defendant applied to W. for the loan of $200. W. said lie had a
note made by M. for $150, payable in hemlock lumber, and if the defendant
would take that note he, W., would let him have the $200, and take the
defendant's note for $350. The defendant replied that he did not want
the M. note, and did not consider it good. Subsequently the defendant
told W. that if he would let him have the $200 that day he would take
the M. note, provided W. would guarantee it. This W. agreed to do, and
thereupon advanced $200 in cash to the defendant, and delivered the M.
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note with a guaranty endorsed, guaranteeing the collection thereof, but
without any consideration expressed, and took from the defendant a note
for $356.97, which embraced the $200 and interest, and the $130 note
and interest. .eld, that even upon the assumption that W. was liable
upon his guaranty of the M. 4.ote, and that he could not elect to avoid it,
the transaction was usurious upon its face within the case of Cleveland vs.
Loder (7 Paige, 559); but that the guaranty was of no validity for
want of a consideration being expressed therein; and that the note for
$150 being turned out by the lender, upon a void agreement of guaranty,
as part of the consideration for a loan, the transaction presented a bold
case of usury: Id.
.eld, also, that the fact that the agreement of W. to guarantee the note
meant a valid guaranty, did not alter the case. That the contract being
executed, at the time, must be held to express the agreement between the
parties, and to furnish, upon its face, the only evidence of the contract
actually made: Id.
Reid, further, that in an action upon the note given by the defendant
to W., the judge should have left it to the jury to say whether it was part
and parcel of the bargain, and the intention of the parties that the borrower should take the $150 note at his own risk in regard to the solvency
of the parties thereto: Id.
One who makes a contract which the law declares usurious cannot escape
the penalty of the offence upon the plea of ignorance of the law, or of the
absence of an intention to evade the statute: Id.
SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN.

1

Gift from Rusband to Wfe-Evidence.-A husband, acting as the
agent of his wife in making settlement of demand in her favor, took a
deed of certain lands in satisfaction, which was made to him instead of
to her. After her death, the heir at law (who was also the administrator)
of the wife, sought in equity an account with respect to these lands, and
the husband defended, claiming them as a gift from the wife. Reld, that
the burden of proof was upon the husband to establish the gift; and that
the fact that the deed was made to him, in the absence of proof that it
was so made by the wife's direction, consent, or knowledge, was no evidence of the gift, and authorized no presumption against the wife's interest: Wales vs. Newbold.
1 From T. W. Cooley, Esq., State Reporter.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

Tender on Condtion.-Where a tender sufficient in amount to discharge
a mechanic's lien upon personal property, was made on condition that the
property be delivered up, and the only objection made to the tender was
that the amount was insufficient; held, that the tender was not vitiated
by the condition: ,Mo/nahan vs. Moore.
Record of an Instrument referring to another Instrummt.-Where a
writing is recorded as a separate paper, which refers to "the within mortgage," but does not in any way describe or identify the mortgage, the
record is no evidence or notice that the writing recorded was indorsed
upon any particular mortgage not recorded with it, as that is an extrinsic
fact not within the purview of the registry laws: Bassett vs. Hathaway.
Common Law Certiorari,what it brings up-Power of the Court upon
it.-TUhe return to a common law writ of certiorari should set out the
evidence upon which the conviction or other judicial act coiplained of
was founded: Jackson vs. People.
The office of a certiorari is not, however, to review questions of fact, but
questions of law. And, in examining into the evidence, the appellate
court does so, not to determine whether the probabilities preponderate one
way or the other, but simply to determine whether the evidence is such
that it will justify the finding as a legitimate inference from the facts
proved, whether that inference would or would not have been drawn by
the appellate tribunal: Id.
But the appellate court will review the rulings of law upon the admission or exclusion of evidence, or other rulings in the proceedings having
a bearing upon the result: Id.
On certiorari to the Recorder's Court of Detroit, to remove the proceedings on conviction for a violation of a city ordinance, the evidence was
embodied in the return by the clerk. Beld, to be properly before the
court: Id.
CarnalKnowledge and Abuse of a Female Child-Assault-Evidence.
-Under an indictment for carnal knowledge and abuse of a female child
under ten years of age, the defendant may be convicted of a simple
assault, notwithstanding the child consented. The offence charged is
rape, and the child has no capacity to consent: People vs. McDonald.
Liability of Municipal Corporationsfor Injuries caused by its Streets
being out of repair.-The city of Detroit let to the lowest bidder, as
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required by its charter, a contract for the construction of a sewer through
one of its public streets. The contract bound the contractor at all times
to keep the excavation fenced in, and carefully guarded to prevent accidents, and provided that the contractor should be liable for all damages
that might arise from accident occasioned by his neglect. For want of
proper guards to the excavation, an injury occurred to a person driving
along the street. Held, that the city was liable: City of Detroit vs. Core.
SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT.

1

Constitutional Law- Obligation of Contract-Taking Franchisefor
Public Use, what-Construction of SStatute-Ferries.-The Hartford
Bridge Company was incorporated in 1808, with power to erect and maintain a toll bridge across the Connecticut River, between Hartford and -East
Hartford. There were, at this time, two legally established ferries between
these towns, and belonging to the towns, located below the proposed site
of the bridge, and within a quarter of a mile of it. In 1818, the bridge
which had been erected soon after the incorporation of the company, having been greatly damaged by a flood, and requiring to be rebuilt, and the
company being unwilling to incur the expense of rebuilding it without
the grant of further privileges, the Legislature passed a resolution that,
upon the bridge being rebuilt to the acceptance of a committee hppointed
for the purpose, the ferries, by law, established between the towns of Hartford and East Hartford, should be discontinued, and said towns should
never thereafter be permitted to transport passengers across said river;
with a provision that if the company should neglect to maintain the
bridge, the towns might open the ferries. In 1857, the Legislature incorporated the Union Ferry Company, with power to establish a ferry across
the Connecticut River, between the towns of Hartford and East Hartford,
at a point not less than a mile below the bridge, but made no provision in
the charter for compensation to the bridge company for the injury to its
franchise. The Ferry Company immediately after established the ferry at
a point a mile and a half below the bridge, and were using it for the conveyance of passengers, and a considerable amount of tolls was thereby
diverted from the bridge. The line of travel was not the same with that
I We are indebted to John Hooker, Esq., the Reporter of the Court, for the points
decided in the following cases, which will be reported in the 29th volume of the
Connecticut Reports, and for which he will accept our thanks.-Eds. Am. Law Reg.
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accommodated by the bridge, and the growth of the city of Hartford in
that direction had been such as to require the acoommodation. On a bill
in equity brought by the bridge company, -to xestrain the ferry company
from the use of the ferry, it was hdd, that the resolution of 181.8 was to
be construed as a contract on the part of the Legislature, only that the
then existing ferries should be discontinued, and that the towns should
not be allowed to revive them; and that the resolution of 1857, establishing the Union Ferry, was not a violation of the contract* and was not
unconstitutional. Storm, C. J., dissenting: EHartford Bridge Companjt
vs. Union Ferry Company.

The same general rules of construction are to be applied to both public
and private grants. The intent of the contract is to be ascertained by a
fair and rational interpretation of the language used, and, when the intent
is ascertained, it is to be carried out against the State as fully as against
an individual: Id.
Where, however, the language of a public grant will equally admit of
two constructions, so that the intent cannot be ascertained, then that construction is to be adopted which is most favorable to the State. This is
but the application of the ordinary rule that the language of a contract
shall be taken most strongly against the party using it, the language
of a public grant being regarded as the language of the party obtaining
it: .ld.
In the present case, the contract of the State that the ferries then existing should be discontinued and never afterwards revived, should be construed as meaning that no ferries substantially the same, and accommodating the same line of travel, should be established: Id.
Remarks on the history of legislation in this State on the subject of
ferries: Id.
Assumpsit-Pleading-Preious Liability as Consideration-Action,

for Contribution.-Although an existing liability is a good consideration
for a promise, whether expressed or implied, to pay money on request, yet
it is not sufficient that a declaration on such a promise should merely state
that there existed such a liability. It must state the facts on which it
arose, and in such a manner that the court can see that there was such a
liability: Bailey vs. Bussing.

The statement of the liability without the facts on which it arose, is a
statement of a mere legal inference, which it is never necessary to allege
in pleading, and which, if alleged, is never traversable: Id.
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A declaration in an action of assumpsit for a contribution, alleged that
a joint judgment had been recovered against the plaintiff, the defendant
and another, which the plaintiff had been compelled to pay, and that
the defendant was in duty bound and liable to pay to the plaintiff onethird of the amount, and being so liable promised, &c., but contained no
allegation as to the cause of action upon which the judgment had been
rendered. Held, that the court could not infer, as a matter of law, that
the cause of action was one which imposed upon the defendant the duty to
contribute, and therefore that no sufficient consideration for the promise
was alleged: Id.
Held, also, that the defect of the declaration was not cured by verdict.
One judge dissenting: 1d.
Trespass, Damages in-.llegal Possession-Liguor Law.-In trespass
for taking personal property, where the property has been taken without
malice and under a claim of right, and the controversy relates only to the
title, the rule of damages is the value of the property at the time of the
taking, and interest from that time to the time of the judgment: Oviatt
vs. Pond.
Where, in such a case, the plaintiff claimed that, by the taking of the
property, he had been broken up in his business, and the judge charged
the jury that the defendant must make the plaintiff good for all the actual
damage sustained by him at the defendant's hands, resulting directly and
naturally from the injury, a new trial was granted on motion of the
defendant: Id.
Under the 27th section of the statute with regard to intemperance, which
provides that "no action shall be maintained for the recovery or possession
of spirituous liquors, or the value thereof, except in cases where persons
owning or possessing such liquors, with lawful intent, may have been illegally deprived of the same," there can be no recovery in an action of
trespass for the value of liquors taken, where the same were kept for
illegal sale: Id.
And this rule was applied where the liquors of the plaintiff had been
attached and taken away by the defendant, an officer, as the property of
another party against whom he held a writ of attachment: Id.
Liquors kept for sale contrary to law, are regarded by the law as having
no lawful value, or value for lawful purposes: Id.
This provision of the statute is constitutional and valid: Id.

